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Abstract. At CRYPTO 2013, Boneh and Zhandry initiated the study of
quantum-secure encryption. They proposed first indistinguishability def-
initions for the quantum world where the actual indistinguishability only
holds for classical messages, and they provide arguments why it might
be hard to achieve a stronger notion. In this work, we show that stronger
notions are achievable, where the indistinguishability holds for quantum
superpositions of messages. We investigate exhaustively the possibilities
and subtle differences in defining such a quantum indistinguishability
notion for symmetric-key encryption schemes. We justify our stronger
definition by showing its equivalence to novel quantum semantic-security
notions that we introduce. Furthermore, we show that our new security
definitions cannot be achieved by a large class of ciphers – those which
are quasi-preserving the message length. On the other hand, we pro-
vide a secure construction based on quantum-resistant pseudorandom
permutations; this construction can be used as a generic transformation
for turning a large class of encryption schemes into quantum indistin-
guishable and hence quantum semantically secure ones. Moreover, our
construction is the first completely classical encryption scheme shown to
be secure against an even stronger notion of indistinguishability, which
was previously known to be achievable only by using quantum messages
and arbitrary quantum encryption circuits.
1 Introduction
Quantum computers [NC00] threaten many cryptographic schemes. By using
Shor’s algorithm [Sho94] and its variants [Wat01], an adversary in possession of a
quantum computer can break the security of every scheme based on factorization
and discrete logarithms, including RSA, ElGamal, elliptic-curve primitives and
many others. Moreover, longer keys and output lengths are required in order to
? An extended abstract of this work appears in the proceedings of CRYPTO 2016.
This is the full version.
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maintain the security of block ciphers and hash functions [Gro96,BHT97]. These
difficulties led to the development of post-quantum cryptography [BBD09], i.e.,
classical cryptography resistant against quantum adversaries.
When modeling the security of cryptographic schemes, care must be taken in
defining exactly what property one wants to achieve. In classical security mod-
els, all parties and communications are classical. When these notions are used
to prove post-quantum security, one must consider adversaries having access to a
quantum computer. This means that, while the communication between the ad-
versary and the user is still classical, the adversary might carry out computations
on a quantum computer.
Such post-quantum notions of security turn out to be unsatisfying in cer-
tain scenarios. For instance, consider quantum adversaries able to use quantum
superpositions of messages
∑
x αx |x〉 instead of classical messages when commu-
nicating with the user, even though the cryptographic primitive is still classical.
This kind of scenario is considered, e.g., in [BZ13,DFNS14,Unr12,Wat09,Zha12].
Such a setting might for example occur in a situation where one party using
a quantum computer encrypts messages for another party that uses a classical
computer and an adversary is able to observe the outcome of the quantum com-
putation before measurement. Other examples are an attacker which is able to
trick a classical device into showing quantum behavior, or a classical scheme
which is used as subprotocol in a larger quantum protocol. Another possibility
occurs when using obfuscation. There are applications where one might want to
distribute the obfuscated code of a symmetric-key encryption scheme (with the
secret key hardcoded) in order to allow a third party to generate ciphertexts
without being able to retrieve the key - think of this as building public-key en-
cryption from symmetric-key encryption using Indistinguishability Obfuscation.
Because in these cases an adversary receives the classical code for producing
encryptions, he could implement the code on his local quantum computer and
query the resulting quantum circuit on a superporition of inputs. Moreover, even
in quantum reductions for classical schemes situations could arise where super-
position access is needed. A typical example are impossibility results (such as
meta-reductions [DFG13]), where giving the adversary additional power often
rules out a broader range of secure reductions. Notions covering such settings
are often called quantum-security notions. In this work we propose new quantum-
security notions for encryption schemes.
For encryption, the notion of semantic security [GM84,Gol04] has been tra-
ditionally used. This notion models in abstract terms the fact that, without the
corresponding decryption key, it is impossible not only to correctly decrypt a
ciphertext, but even to recover any non-trivial information about the underlying
plaintext. The exact definition of semantic security is cumbersome to work with
in security proofs as it is simulation-based. Therefore, the simpler notion of ci-
phertext indistinguishability has been introduced. This notion is given in terms
of an interactive game where an adversary has to distinguish the encryptions of
two messages of his choice. The advantage of this definition is that it is easier to
work with than (but equivalent to) semantic security.
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To the best of our knowledge, no quantum semantic-security notions for
classical encryption schemes have been proposed so far. For indistinguishability,
Boneh and Zhandry introduced indistinguishability notions for quantum-secure
encryption under chosen-plaintext attacks in a recent work [BZ13]. They con-
sider a model (IND-qCPA) where a quantum adversary can query the encrypting
device in superposition during a learning phase but is limited to classical com-
munication during the actual challenge phase. However, in the symmetric-key
scenario, this approach has the following shortcoming: If we assume that an
adversary can get quantum access in a learning phase, it seems unreasonable
to assume that he cannot get such access when the actual message of interest
is encrypted. Boneh and Zhandry showed that a seemingly natural notion of
quantum indistinguishability is unachievable. In order to restore a meaningful
definition, they resorted to the compromise of IND-qCPA.
Our contributions. In this paper we achieve two main results. On the one hand,
we initiate the study of semantic security in the quantum world, providing new
definitions and a thorough discussion about the motivations and difficulties of
modeling these notions correctly. This study is concluded by a suitable definition
of quantum semantic security under chosen plaintext attacks (qSEM-qCPA). On
the other hand, we extend the fundamental work initiated in [BZ13] in finding
suitable notions of indistinguishability in the quantum world. We show that
the compromise that had to be reached there in order to define an achievable
notion instead of a more natural one (i.e., IND-qCPA vs. fqIND-qCPA) can be
overcome – although not trivially. We show how various other possible notions
of quantum indistinguishability can be defined. All these security notions span
a tree of possibilities which we analyze exhaustively in order to find the most
suitable definition of quantum indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attacks
(qIND-qCPA). We prove this notion to be achievable, strictly stronger than IND-
qCPA, and equivalent to qSEM-qCPA, thereby completing an elegant framework
of security notions in the quantum world, see Figure 2 below for an overview.
Furthermore, we formally define the notion of a core function and quasi–
length-preserving ciphers – encryption schemes which essentially do not increase
the plaintext size, such as stream ciphers and many block ciphers including AES –
and we show the impossibility of achieving our new security notion for this kind
of schemes. While this impossibility might look worrying from an application
perspective, we also present a transformation that turns a block cipher into
an encryption scheme fulfilling our notion. This transformation also works in
respect to an even stronger notion of indistinguishability in the quantum world,
which was introduced in [BJ15], and previously only known to be achievable in
the setting of computational quantum encryption, that is, the scenario where all
the parties have quantum computing capabilities, and encryption is performed
through arbitrary quantum circuits operating on quantum data. Even if this
scenario goes in a very different direction from the scope of our work, it is
interesting to note that our construction is the first fully classical scheme secure
even in respect to such a purely quantum notion of security.
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The ‘frozen smart-card’ example. In order to clarify why quantum security
allows the adversary quantum superposition access to classical primitives - as
opposed to the case of post-quantum security - we give a motivating example. In
this mind experiment, we consider a not-so-distant future where the target of an
attack is a tiny encryption chip, e.g., integrated into an RFID tag or smart-card.
It is reasonable to assume that it will include elements of technology currently re-
searched but undeployed (i.e., extreme miniaturization, optical electronics, etc.)
Regardless, the chip we consider is a purely classical device, performing classical
encryption (e.g. AES) on classical inputs, and outputting classical outputs.
Consider an adversary equipped with some future technology which subjects
the device to a fault-injection environment, by varying the physical parameters
(such as temperature, power, speed, etc.) under which the device usually oper-
ates. As a figurative example, our ‘quantum hacker’ could place the chip into an
isolation pod, which keeps the device at a very low temperature and shields it
from any external electromagnetic or thermal interference. This situation would
be analogous to what happens when security researchers perform side channel
analysis on cryptographic hardware in nowaday’s labs, using techniques such as
thermal or electromagnetic manipulation which were previously considered fu-
turistic. There is no guarantee that, under these conditions, the chip does not
start to show full or partial quantum behaviour. At this point, the adversary
could query the device on a superposition of plaintexts by using, e.g., a laser
and an array of beam splitters when feeding signals into the chip via optic fiber.
It is unclear today what a future attacker might be able to achieve using
such an attack. As traditionally done in cryptography, we assume the worst-case
scenario where the attacker can actually query the target device in superposition.
Classical security notions such as IND-CPA do not cover this scenario while our
new notion qIND-qCPA does. This setting is an example of what we mean by
‘tricking classical parties into quantum behaviour’.
Related work. The idea of considering scenarios where a quantum adver-
sary can force other parties into quantum behaviour has been first considered
in [DFNS14]. Attacks exploiting classical encryptions in quantum superposition
have been described in [KM10,KM12,KLLNP16,SS16]. In [BZ13] the authors
also consider the security of signature schemes where the adversary can have
quantum access to a signing oracle. Quantum superposition queries have also
been investigated relatively to the random oracle model [BDF+11]. Another
quantum indistinguishability notion has been suggested (but not further ana-
lyzed) by Velema in [Vel13]. Prior work has considered the security of quantum
methods to encrypt classical data in the computational setting [Kos07,XY12].
In concurrent and independent work, Broadbent and Jeffery [BJ15] introduce
indistinguishability notions for the public- and secret-key encryption of quan-
tum messages in the context of fully homomorphic quantum computation. We
refer to Page 16 for a more detailed description of how their definitions relate to
our framework. A more complete overview for these notions, including semantic
security for quantum encryption schemes, can be found in another concurrent
work [ABF+16].
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2 Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly recall the classical security notions for encryption
schemes secure against chosen plaintext attacks (CPA). In addition, we revisit
the two existing indistinguishability notions for the quantum world. We start by
introducing notation we will use throughout the paper.
We say that a function f : N → R is polynomially bounded iff there exists
a polynomial p and a value n¯ ∈ N such that: for every n ≥ n¯ we have that
f(n) ≤ p(n); in this case we will just write f = poly (n). We say that a function
ε : N → R is negligible, if and only if for every polynomial p, there exists an
np ∈ N such that ε(n) ≤ 1p(n) for every n ≥ np; in this case we will just write
ε = negl (n). In this work, we focus on secret-key encryption schemes. In all that
follows we use n ∈ N as the security parameter.
Definition 2.1 (Secret-key encryption scheme [Gol04]). A secret-key en-
cryption scheme is a triple of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (Gen, Enc,
Dec) operating on a message space M = {0, 1}m (where m = poly (n) ∈ N) that
fulfills the following two conditions:
1. The key generation algorithm Gen(1n) on input of security parameter n in
unary outputs a bitstring k.
2. For all k in the range of Gen(1n) and any message x ∈ M, the algorithms
Enc (encryption) and Dec (decryption) satisfy Pr[Dec(k,Enc(k, x)) = x] = 1,
where the probability is taken over the internal coin tosses of Enc and Dec.
We write K for the range of Gen(1n) (the key space) and Enck(x) for Enc(k, x).
2.1 Classical Security Notions: IND-CPA and SEM-CPA.
We turn to security notions for encryption schemes. In this work, we will only
look at the notions of indistinguishability of ciphertexts under adaptively cho-
sen plaintext attack (IND-CPA), and semantic security under adaptively chosen
plaintext attack (SEM-CPA), which are known to be equivalent (e.g., [Gol04]).
Game-based definitions. In general these notions can be defined as a game
between a challenger C and an adversary A. First, C generates a legitimate key
running k ←− Gen(1n) which he uses throughout the game. The game starts
with a first learning phase. A challenge phase follows where A receives a chal-
lenge. Afterwards, a second learning phase follows, and finally A has to output a
solution. The learning phases define the type of attack, and the challenge phase
the notion captured by the game. We give all our definitions by referring to this
game framework and by defining a learning and a challenge phase.
The CPA learning phase: A is allowed to adaptively ask C for encryptions
of messages of his choice. C answers the queries using key k. Note that this is
equivalent to saying that A gets oracle access to an encryption oracle that was
initialized with key k.
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The IND challenge phase: A defines a challenge template consisting of two
equal-length messages x0, x1, and sends it to C. The challenger C samples a
random bit b
$←− {0, 1} uniformly at random, and replies with the encryption
Enck(xb). A’s goal is to guess b.
Definition 2.2 (IND-CPA). A secret-key encryption scheme is said to be
IND-CPA secure if the success probability of any probabilistic polynomial-time
adversary winning the game defined by CPA learning phases and an IND chal-
lenge phase is at most negligibly (in n) close to 1/2.
The SEM challenge phase: A sends C a challenge template (Sm, hm, fm)
consisting of a poly-sized circuit Sm specifying a distribution over m-bit long
plaintexts, an advise function hm : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}∗, and a target function
fm : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}∗. The challenger C replies with the pair (Enck(x), hm(x))
where x is sampled according to Sm. A’s challenge is to output fm(x).
In the definition of semantic security it is not required that A’s probability
of winning the game is always negligible. Instead, A’s success probability is
compared to that of a simulator S that plays in a reduced game: On one hand, S
gets no learning phases. On the other hand, during the challenge phase, S does
not receive the ciphertext but only the output of the advice function. This use
of a simulator is what makes the notion hard to work with in proofs as one has
to construct a simulator for every possible A to prove a scheme secure.
Definition 2.3 (SEM-CPA). A secret-key encryption scheme is said to be
SEM-CPA secure if for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A there ex-
ists a probabilistic polynomial-time simulator S such that the challenge templates
produced by S and A are identically distributed and the success probability of A
winning the game defined by CPA learning phases and a SEM challenge phase
(computed over the coins of A, Gen, and Sm) is negligibly close (in n) to the
success probability of S winning the reduced game.
Semantic security models what we want an encryption scheme to achieve:
An adversary given a ciphertext can learn nothing about the encrypted message
which he could not also learn from his knowledge of the message distribution
and possibly existing side-information (modeled by hm). Indistinguishability of
ciphertexts is an equivalent technical notion introduced to simplify proofs.
2.2 Previous Notions of Security in the Quantum World
We briefly recall the results from [BZ13] about quantum indistinguishability no-
tions. We refer to [NC00] for commonly used notation and quantum information-
theoretic concepts. Given security parameter n, let {Hn}n be a family of complex
Hilbert spaces such that dimHn = 2poly(n). We assume that Hn contains all the
subspaces where the message states, the ciphertext states and any auxiliary state
live. For the sake of simplicity we will not make a distinction when writing that
a state |ϕ〉 belongs to one particular subspace, and we will omit the index n
6
when the security parameter is implicit, therefore writing just |ϕ〉 ∈ H. We will
denote pure states with ket notation, e.g., |ϕ〉, while mixed states will be denoted
by lowercase Greek letters, e.g. ρ. We start by defining what we call a classical
description of a quantum state:
Definition 2.4 (Classical Description). A classical description of a quantum
state ρ is a (classical) bitstring describing a quantum circuit S which (takes no
input but starts from a fixed initial state |0〉 and) outputs ρ.
This definition will be used later in our new notions of security. We deviate
here from the traditional meaning of ‘classical description’ referring to individual
numerical entries of the density matrix. The reason is that our definition also
covers the cases where those numerical entries are not easily computable, as
long as we can give an explicit constructive procedure for that state. Clearly,
every pure quantum state |ϕ〉 has a classical description (given by a description
of the quantum circuit which implements the unitary that maps |0〉 to |ϕ〉. The
classical description of a mixed state ρA is given by the circuit which first creates
a purification |ϕ〉AR of ρA and then only outputs the A register. Note that a state
admitting a classical description cannot be entangled with any other system.
For encryption, following the approach in [BZ13] and many other works, we
define the following:
Definition 2.5 (Quantum Encryption Oracle [BZ13]). Let Enc be the en-
cryption algorithm of a secret-key encryption scheme E. We define the quantum
encryption oracle UEnck associated with E and initialized with key k as (a family
of) unitary operators defined by:
UEnck :
∑
x,y
αx,y |x〉 |y〉 7→
∑
x,y
αx,y |x〉 |y ⊕ Enck(x)〉 (1)
where the same randomness r is used in superposition in all the executions of
Enck(x) within one query
6 – for each new query, a fresh independent r is used.
The first indistinguishability notion proposed in [BZ13] replaces all classical
communication between A and C by quantum communication. A and C are now
quantum circuits operating on quantum states, and sharing a certain number of
qubits (the quantum communication register). The definition for the new security
game is obtained from Definition 2.2 by changing the learning and challenge
phases as follows:
Quantum CPA learning phase (qCPA): A gets oracle access to UEnck .
Fully quantum IND challenge phase (fqIND): A prepares the communica-
tion register in the state
∑
x0,x1,y
αx0,x1,y |x0〉 |x1〉 |y〉, consisting of two m-qubit
states (the two input-message superpositions) and an ancilla state to store the
ciphertext. C samples a bit b $←− {0, 1} and applies the transformation:∑
x0,x1,y
αx0,x1,y |x0〉 |x1〉 |y〉 7→
∑
x0,x1,y
αx0,x1,y |x0〉 |x1〉 |y ⊕ Enck(xb)〉 .
6 As shown in [BZ13], this is not restrictive.
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A’s goal is to output b.
The resulting security notion in [BZ13] is called indistinguishability under
fully quantum chosen-message attacks (IND-fqCPA). We decided to rename
it to fully quantum indistinguishability under quantum chosen-message attacks
(fqIND-qCPA) in order to fit into our naming scheme: It consists of a quantum
CPA learning phase and a fully quantum IND challenge phase.
Definition 2.6 (fqIND-qCPA). A secret-key encryption scheme is said to
be fqIND-qCPA secure if the success probability of any quantum probabilistic
polynomial-time adversary winning the game defined by qCPA learning phases
and a fqIND challenge phase is at most negligibly close (in n) to 1/2.
As already observed in [BZ13], this notion is unachievable. The separation
by Boneh and Zhandry exploits the entanglement of quantum states, namely the
fact that entanglement can be created between plaintext and ciphertext.
Theorem 2.7 (BZ attack [BZ13, Theorem 4.2]). No symmetric-key en-
cryption scheme can achieve fqIND-qCPA security.
Proof. The attack works as follows: The adversary A chooses as challenge mes-
sages the states |0m〉 and H |0m〉 (where H denotes the m-fold tensor Hadamard
transform), i.e. he prepares the register in the state
∑
x
1
2m/2
|0m, x, 0m〉. When
the challenger C performs the encryption, we can have two cases:
– if b = 0, i.e. the first message state is chosen, the state is transformed into∑
x
1
2m/2
|0m, x,Enck(0m)〉 = |0m〉 ⊗H |0m〉 ⊗ |Enck(0m)〉 ;
– if b = 1, i.e. the second message state is chosen, the state is transformed into∑
x
1
2m/2
|0m, x,Enck(x)〉 = |0m〉 ⊗
∑
x
1
2m/2
|x,Enck(x)〉 .
Notice that in the second case we have a fully entangled state between the second
and the third register. At this point, A does the following:
1. measures (traces out) the third register;
2. applies again H to the second register;
3. measures the second register;
4. outputs b′ = 1 iff the outcome of this last measurement is 0m, else outputs 0.
In fact, if b = 0, then the second register is left untouched: By applying again the
Hadamard transformation it will be reset to the state |0m〉, and a measurement
on this state will yield 0m with probability 1. If b = 1 instead, tracing out
one half of a fully entangled state results in a complete mixture in the second
register. Applying a Hadamard transform and measuring in the computational
basis necessarily gives a fully random outcome, and hence outcome 0m only with
probability 12m , which is negligible in n, because m = poly (n). uunionsq
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Theorem 2.7 implies that the fqIND-qCPA notion is too strong. In order to
weaken it, the following notion of indistinguishability under adaptively chosen
quantum plaintext attacks was introduced:
Definition 2.8 (IND-qCPA [BZ13]). A secret-key encryption scheme is said
to be IND-qCPA secure if the success probability of any quantum probabilistic
polynomial-time adversary winning the game defined by qCPA learning phases
and a classical IND challenge phase is at most negligibly close (in n) to 1/2.
In this definition, the CPA queries are allowed to be quantum, but the chal-
lenge query is required to be classical. It has been shown that, under standard
computational assumptions, IND-qCPA is strictly stronger than IND-CPA:
Theorem 2.9 (IND-CPA 6⇒ IND-qCPA [BZ13, Theorem 4.8]). If clas-
sically secure PRFs exist and order-finding in prime groups is classically hard,
then there exists an encryption scheme E which is IND-CPA secure, but not
IND-qCPA secure.
3 New Notions of Quantum Indistinguishability
IND-qCPA might be viewed as classical indistinguishability (IND) under a quan-
tum chosen plaintext attack (qCPA). The authors in [BZ13] resorted to this
definition in order to overcome their impossibility result on one seemingly nat-
ural notion of quantum indistinguishability (fqIND-qCPA) which turned out to
be too strong. This raises the question whether IND-qCPA is the only possible
quantum indistinguishability notion (and hence no classical encryption scheme
can achieve indistinguishability of ciphertext superpositions) or if there exists a
stronger notion which can be achieved.
In this section we show that by defining fqIND-qCPA, there are many choices
which are made implicitly, and that on the other hand there exist other possible
quantum indistinguishability notions. We discuss these choices spanning a binary
‘security tree’ of possible notions. Afterwards, we obtain a small set of candidate
notions, eliminating those that are either ill-posed or unachievable because of
the BZ attack from Theorem 2.7. In all these notions, we implicitly assume
‘quantum CPA learning phases’, as in the case of IND-qCPA. However, we limit
the discussion in this section to the design of a quantum challenge phase. In the
end, we select a suitable ‘qIND-’notion amongst all the possible candidate ones.
3.1 The ‘Security Tree’
To define a general notion of indistinguishability in the quantum world, we have
to consider many different distinctions for possible candidate models. For exam-
ple, can we rule out certain forms of entanglement? How? Does the adversary
have complete control over the challenger device? Each of these distinctions
leads to a fork in a ‘security-model binary tree’. We analyze every ‘leaf’ of the
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tree7. Some of them lead to unreasonable or ill-posed models, some of them yield
unachievable security notions, and others are analyzed in more detail.
Game model: Oracle (O) vs. Challenger (C). This distinction decides how
the game, and especially the challenge phase, is implemented. In the classical
world, the following two cases are equivalent but in the quantum world they
differ. In the oracle model, the adversary A gets oracle access to encryption and
challenge oracles, i.e., he plays the game by performing calls to unitary gates
O1, . . . ,Oq. In this case A is modeled as a quantum circuit which implements a
sequence of unitary gates U0, . . . , Uq, intertwined by calls to the Oi’s. Given an
input state |ϕ〉, the adversary therefore computes the state:
UqOq . . . U1O1U0 |ϕ〉 .
The structure of the oracle gates Oi itself is unknown to A, who is only
allowed to apply them in a black-box way. The fqIND notion uses this model.
In what we call the challenger model instead, the game is played against
an external (quantum) challenger. Here, A is a quantum circuit which shares
a quantum register (the communication channel) with another quantum circuit
C. The main difference is that in this case we can also consider what happens
if C has additional input or output lines out of A’s control. Moreover, A does
not automatically gain access to the inverse (adjoint) of quantum operations
performed by C, and C cannot be ‘rewound’ by the adversary, which would be
far too powerful possibilities. This scenario also covers the case of ‘unidirectional’
state transmission, i.e., when qubits are sent over a quantum channel to another
party, and they are not available afterwards until that party sends them back.
Regardless, in security proofs in the (C) model, it is still allowed for an external
entity (e.g. a simulator, or a reduction) to rewind the joint circuit composed by
adversary and challenger together, if need be. However, we are not aware of any
known reduction involving rewinding in this form for encryption schemes in the
quantum world.
In order to keep consistency with this choice of the model, when also con-
sidering qCPA queries, we implicitly assume the same access mode to the Enck
oracle as in the qIND game. That is, if we are in the (O) scenario, during the
qCPA phase A has quantum oracle access to Enck. In the (C) case, instead,
superposition access to Enck is provided to A by an external challenger.
At first glance, the (O) model intuitively represents the scenario where A
has almost complete control of some encryption device, whereas the (C) model is
more suited to a ‘network’ scenario where A wants to compromise the security
of some external target.
Plaintexts: quantum states (Q) vs. classical description (c). In the (Q)
model, the two m-qubit plaintexts chosen by A for the challenge template can
be arbitrary (BQP-producible) quantum states and can be entangled with each
other and other states. In the (c) model, instead, A is only allowed to choose
classical descriptions of two m-qubit quantum states according to Definition 2.4,
7 We do not rule out that some of them might eventually lead to the same model.
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thus being only allowed to send classical information to C: the challenger C will
read the states’ descriptions and will build one of the two states depending on
his challenge bit b.
In classical models, there is no difference between sending a description of a
message or the message itself. In the quantum world, there is a big difference
between these two cases, as the latter allows A to establish entanglement of
the message(s) with other registers. This is not possible when using classical
descriptions. It might intuitively appear that the (Q) model (considered for the
fqIND-qCPA notion) is more natural. However, the (c) scenario models the case
where A is well aware of the message that is encrypted, but the message is not
constructed by A himself. Giving A the ability to choose the challenge messages
for the IND game models the worst case that might happen: A knows that the
ciphertext he receives is the encryption of one out of the two messages that
he can distinguish best. This closely reflects the intuition behind the classical
IND notions: in that game, the adversary is allowed to send the two messages
not because in the real world he would be allowed to do so, but because we
want to achieve security even for the best possible choice of messages from the
adversary’s perspective. Hence, the (c) model is a valid alternative. Will further
discuss the difference between these two models later.
Relaying of plaintext states: Yes (Y ) vs. No (n). If C is not relaying (n),
this means that the two plaintext states chosen by A will not be ‘sent back’ to
A (in other words: their registers will not be available anymore to A after the
challenge encryption). In circuit terms, this means that at the beginning of the
game, C will have (one or two) ancilla registers in his internal (private) memory.
During the encryption phase, C will swap these register(s) with the content of
the original plaintext register(s), hence transferring their original content outside
of A’s control.
If the challenger is relaying (Y ) instead, this means that the two plaintext
states will be left in the original register (or channel), and may be accessed by
A at any moment. This is the model considered for fqIND.
Again, the (Y ) case is more fitting to those cases whereA ‘implements locally’
the encryption device and has almost full control of it, whereas the (n) case is
more appropriate when the game is played against some external entity which is
not under A’s control. This is a rather natural assumption, for example, when
states are sent over some quantum channel and not returned. We stress that
this distinction in relaying is not trivial: it is not possible for A, in general, to
simulate relaying by keeping internal states entangled with the plaintexts. As an
example, consider the attack in Theorem 2.7: it is easy to see that this cannot
be performed without relaying.
Type of unitary transformation: (1) vs. (2). In quantum computing, the
‘canonical’ way of evaluating a function f(x) in superposition is by using an
auxiliary register: ∑
x,y
αx,y |x, y〉 7→
∑
x,y
αx,y |x, y ⊕ f(x)〉 .
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This way ensures that the resulting operator is invertible, even if f is not. We call
this type-(1) transformations: if Enck is an encryption mapping m-bit plaintexts
to `-bit ciphertexts, the resulting operator in this case will act on m+ ` qubits
in the following way:∑
x,y
αx,y |x, y〉 7→
∑
x,y
αx,y |x, y ⊕ Enck(x)〉 ,
where the y’s are ancillary values. This approach is also used for fqIND.
In our case, though, we do not consider arbitrary functions, but encryptions,
which act as bijections on some bit-string spaces (assuming that the randomness
is treated as an input.) Therefore, provided that the encryption does not change
the size of a message, the following transformation is also invertible:∑
x
αx |x〉 7→
∑
x
αx |Enck(x)〉 . (2)
For the more general case of arbitrary message expansion factors, we will consider
transformations of the form:∑
x,y
αx,y |x, y〉 7→
∑
x,y
αx,y |ϕx,y〉 ,
where the length of the ancilla register is |y|= |Enck(x)|− |x| and ϕx,0= Enck(x)
for every x – i.e., initializing the ancilla y register in the |0〉 state produces a
correct encryption, which is what we expect from an honest quantum executor.
One might ask what happens if the ancilla is not initialized to 0, and we leave the
general case of arbitrary ancillas manipulation as an interesting open problem,
but we stress the fact that this behavior is not considered in the case of honest
parties. We call these type-(2) transformations8.
Notice that, in general, type-(1) and type-(2) transformations are very differ-
ent: having quantum oracle access to a type-(2) unitary U
(2)
Enc and its adjoint also
gives access to the related type-(2) decryption oracle U
(2)
Dec :
∑
x αx |Enck(x)〉 7→∑
x αx |x〉. In fact, notice that (U (2)Enc)† = U (2)Dec, while the adjoint of a type-(1)
encryption operator, (U
(1)
Enc)
†, is generally not a type-(1) decryption operator. In
particular, type-(2) operators are ‘more powerful’ in the sense that knowledge of
the secret key is required in order to build any efficient quantum circuit imple-
menting them. However, we stress the fact that whenever access to a decryption
oracle is allowed, the two models are completely equivalent, because then we
can simulate a type-(2) operator by using ancilla qubits and ‘uncomputing’ the
resulting garbage lines (see Figure 1) (as we will see, this will be the case for the
challenger in our qIND notion).
3.2 Analysis of the models
By considering these 4 distinctions in the security tree we have 24 = 16 possi-
ble candidate models to analyze. We label each of these candidate models by
8 These are called minimal quantum oracles in [KKVB02].
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Fig. 1. Equivalence between type-(1) and type-(2) in the case of 1-qubit messages. Left:
building a type-(1) encryption oracle by using a type-(2) encryption oracle (and its
inverse) as a black-box. Right: building a type-(2) encryption oracle by using type-(1)
encryption and decryption oracles as black-boxes.
appending each one of the 4 labels of every tree branch in brackets. Clearly,
16 different definitions of quantum indistinguishability is too much, but luckily
most of these are unreasonable or unachievable. To start with, we can ignore the
following:
Leaves of the form (Oc . . .). In the O scenario, the oracle is actually a
quantum gate inside A’s quantum circuitry. Therefore A has the capability of
querying the oracle on states which are possibly entangled with other registers
kept by A itself.
Leaves of the form (OQn . . .). Again, the oracle is a gate which has no
internal memory to store and keep the plaintext states sent by A.
Leaves of the form (. . . Y 2). Relaying is not taken into account in type-
(2) transformations. In these transformations, to some extent, one of the two
plaintext registers is always relayed (after having been ‘transformed’ into a ci-
phertext). If the other plaintext was to be relayed as well, this would immediately
compromise indistinguishability (because one of the two states would be modified
and the other not, and both of them would be handed over to A).
Excluding these options leaves us with 7 models, but it is easy to see that 3
of them are unachievable because of the attack from Theorem 2.7. This is the
case for (OQY 1) (which is exactly fqIND-qCPA), (CQY 1), and (CcY 1). Of the
remaining 4, notice that (CQn1) and (Ccn1) are equivalent to the IND-qCPA
notion from [BZ13]. The reason is that from A’s perspective, a non-relaying C is
indistinguishable from a C tracing out (measuring) the plaintext register (other-
wise A and C could communicate faster than light). This measuring operation
would make the ciphertext collapse into a single (classical) ciphertext. And since
tracing out the challenge register and applying the type-(1) operator U
(1)
Enc com-
mute, one can consider (without loss of generality) the case that A himself first
measures the plaintext register, and then initiates a classical IND query with
C, therefore recovering a classical definition of IND challenge query9. Therefore,
9 However, we stress that this interpretation is not entirely correct. In fact, one might
consider composition scenarios where the IND query is just an intermediate step,
and the plaintext and ciphertext registers are reunited at some later step. In such
scenarios, not relaying would not be equivalent to measuring. We ignore such con-
siderations in this work, and leave the general case of composable security as an
interesting open question.
13
using any of (CQn1) or (Ccn1) would lead to a weaker notion of quantum in-
distinguishability. Since we are interested in achieving stronger notions, we will
hence consider the more challenging scenarios (CQn2) and (Ccn2).
This argument also leads to the following interesting observation. Ultimately,
whether a challenger (or encryption device) performs type-(1) or type-(2) oper-
ations depends on its architecture which we cannot say anything about - we will
focus on the (. . . 2) models in order to be on the ‘safe side’, as they lead to secu-
rity notions which are harder to achieve. In order to design a secure encryption
device, it is good advice to avoid the possibility that it can be accessed in type-
(2) mode. For such a device, it would be sufficient to provide IND-qCPA security,
which is weaker and therefore easier to achieve. Clearly, providing guidelines on
how to construct encryption devices resilient to type-(2) access lies outside the
scope of this work.
3.3 qIND
At this point we are left with only two candidate notions: (Ccn2) and (CQn2).
From now on we will denote them as ‘quantum indistinguishability of ciphertexts’
(qIND) and ‘general quantum indistinguishability of ciphertexts’ (gqIND) resp.,
and we summarize the resulting challenge phases as follows.
Quantum IND challenge phase (qIND): A chooses two quantum states
ρ0, ρ1 having efficient (poly-sized) classical descriptions, and sends to C a chal-
lenge template consisting of these two classical descriptions according to Defini-
tion 2.4. C samples a bit b and replies to A with the state obtained by applying
the type-(2) operator U
(2)
Enck
as defined in (2) to ρb. A’s goal is to output b.
General Quantum IND challenge phase (gqIND): A chooses two quantum
states ρ0, ρ1, and sends them to C. C samples a bit b, discards (traces out) ρ1−b,
and replies to A with the state obtained by applying the type-(2) operator U (2)Enck
as defined in (2) to ρb. A’s goal is to output b.
Using these challenge phases and the notion of a qCPA learning phase, we
define qIND-qCPA and gqIND-qCPA as follows.
Definition 3.1 (qIND-qCPA). A secret-key encryption scheme is said to be
qIND-qCPA secure if the success probability of any quantum probabilistic poly-
nomial time adversary winning the game defined by qCPA learning phases and
the qIND challenge phase above is at most negligibly close (in n) to 1/2.
Definition 3.2 (gqIND-qCPA). A secret-key encryption scheme is said to
be gqIND-qCPA secure if the success probability of any quantum probabilistic
polynomial time adversary winning the game defined by qCPA learning phases
and the gqIND challenge phase above is at most negligibly close (in n) to 1/2.
Since we mainly consider type-(2) transformations from now on, we will over-
load notation and also use UEnck to denote the type-(2) encryption operator.
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Theorem 3.3 (gqIND-qCPA ⇒ qIND-qCPA). Let E be a gqIND-qCPA
secure symmetric-key encryption scheme. Then E is also qIND-qCPA secure.
The reason is that quantum states admitting an efficient classical description
(used in qIND) are just a special case of arbitrary quantum plaintext states (used
in gqIND). Despite this implication, we will mainly focus on the qIND notion in
the following, and we will use the gqIND notion only as a comparison to other
existing notions. The main reason for this choice is that in the context of classical
encryption schemes resistant to superposition quantum access, we believe that
it is important to not lose focus of what the capabilities of a ‘reasonable’ ad-
versary should be. Namely, recall the following classical IND argument: allowing
the adversary to send plaintexts to the challenger is equivalent to the fact that
indistinguishability must hold even for the most favorable case from the adver-
sary’s perspective. Such an argument does not hold anymore quantumly. In fact,
the (Q) model considered in gqIND presents the following issues:
– it allows entanglement between the adversary and the challenger: A could
prepare a state of the form ρAB =
1√
2
|00〉+ 1√
2
|11〉, sending ρA as a plaintext
but keeping ρB ;
– it allows the adversary to create certain non-reproduceable states. For ex-
ample, consider the state |ψ〉 = ∑x∈X 1√|X| |x, h(x)〉, where h is a collision-
resistant hash function. A could measure the second register, obtaining a
random outcome y, and knowing therefore that the remaining state is the su-
perposition of the preimages of y, |ψy〉 =
∑
x∈X:h(x)=y
1√
|{ x∈X:h(x)=y }| |x〉.
A could then use |ψy〉 as a plaintext in the challenge phase, but note that A
cannot reproduce |ψy〉 for a given value y.
Both of the above examples are not reasonable in our scenario. Entanglement be-
tween A and C represents a sort of ‘quantum watermarking’ of messages, which
goes beyond what a meaningful notion of indistinguishability should achieve.
Knowledge of intermediate, unpredictable measurements also rendersA too pow-
erful, because it gives A access to information not available to C itself - e.g., in
the example above C would not even know the value of y. As it is C who prepares
the state to be encrypted, it is reasonable to assume that it is C who should know
these intermediate measurements, not A. In the example above, what A could
see instead (provided he knows the circuit generating the state, as we assume in
qIND) is that the plaintext is a mixture Ψ =
∑
y ψy for all possible values of y.
The possibility offered by gqIND of allowing the adversary to play the IND
game with arbitrary states is certainly elegant from a theoretical point of view,
but from the perspective of the quantum security of the kind of schemes we
are considering, it is too broad in scope. The (c) model used in qIND, on the
other hand, inherently provides guidelines and reasonable limitations on what a
quantum adversary can or cannot do. Also, qIND is often easier to deal with:
notice that in the (c) model, unlike in the (Q) model, A always receives back an
unentangled state from a challenge query. In security reductions, this means that
we can more easily simulate the challenger, and that we do not have to take care
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of measures of entanglement when analyzing the properties of quantum states -
for example, indistinguishability of states can be shown by only resorting to the
trace norm instead of the more general diamond norm.
Furthermore, it is important to notice that all our new results in Section 6 are
unaffected by the choice of either qIND or gqIND. Our impossibility result from
Theorem 6.3 holds for qIND, and hence also for gqIND because of Theorem 3.3.
On the other hand, the security proof of Construction 6.6 (Theorem 6.9) is
given for gqIND, and holds therefore also for qIND. In fact, it remains unclear
whether a separation between qIND and gqIND can be found at all in the realm
of classical encryption schemes. We leave this as an interesting open question.
Finally, we note that the q-IND-CPA-2 indistinguishability notion for secret-
key encryption of quantum messages introduced by Broadbent and Jeffery [BJ15,
Appendix B] resembles our gqIND notion, and it is in fact equivalent to it in
the case that the encryption operation is a symmetric-key classical functionality
operating in type-(2) mode.
Theorem 3.4 (gqIND-qCPA ⇔ q-IND-CPA-2). Let E be a symmetric-key
encryption scheme. Then E is gqIND-qCPA secure iff E is q-IND-CPA-2 secure.
A proof of the above theorem can be found in Appendix C. A generalization
of q-IND-CPA-2 to arbitrary quantum encryption schemes, together with equiv-
alent notions of quantum semantic security, was given and analized in [ABF+16].
All these security notions are given in the context of ‘fully quantum encryption’,
in the sense that the encryption schemes considered in [BJ15] and [ABF+16]
are arbitrary quantum circuits acting natively on quantum data, while in this
work we consider the quantum security of classical encryption schemes. The fully
quantum homomorphic schemes which are shown to be secure in [BJ15], and the
other quantum encryption schemes shown to be secure in [ABF+16], do not fall
into the category of classical encryption schemes which we are studying here. On
the other hand, as Theorem 6.9 shows, our Construction 6.6 is the first known
example of a classical symmetric-key encryption scheme which is secure even
against these kinds of ‘fully quantum’ security notions.
4 New Notions of Quantum Semantic Security
In this section, we initiate the study of suitable definitions of semantic security
in the quantum world. As in the classical case, we are particularly interested in
notions that can be proven equivalent to some version of quantum indistinguisha-
bility. So these definitions actually describe the semantics of the equivalent IND
notions. As in the classical case, we present these notions in the non-uniform
model of computation.
Working towards a quantum SEM notion, we restrict our analysis to the SEM
challenge phase. For the learning phase, we stick to the ‘qCPA learning phase’, as
in Definition 2.5, where the adversary has access to a quantum encryption oracle.
In the end, we give a definition for quantum semantic security under quantum
chosen-plaintext attacks (qSEM-qCPA) which we later prove equivalent to qIND-
qCPA, thereby adding semantics to our qIND-qCPA notion.
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4.1 Classical Semantic Security under Quantum CPA
As a first notion of semantic security in the quantum world, we consider what
happens if, like in the IND-qCPA notion, we stick to the classical definition
but we allow for a quantum chosen-plaintext-attack phase. The definition uses
a SEM-qCPA game that is obtained by combining qCPA learning phases with
a classical SEM challenge phase as defined in Section 2. As in the classical case,
A’s success probability is compared to that of a simulator S that plays in a
reduced game: S gets no learning phase and during the challenge phase it only
receives the advice hm(x), not the ciphertext.
Definition 4.1 (SEM-qCPA). A secret-key encryption scheme is called SEM-
qCPA-secure if for every quantum polynomial-time machine A, there exists a
quantum polynomial-time machine S such that the challenge templates produced
by S and A are identically distributed and the success probability of A winning the
game defined by qCPA learning phases and a SEM challenge phase is negligibly
close (in n) to the success probability of S winning the reduced game.
Spoiler. It is easy to see that the SEM-qCPA notion of semantic security is
equivalent to IND-qCPA, see Theorem 5.1.
In Appendix D we discuss what happens if one also allows quantum advice
states in this scenario, and why this option would not add anything meaningful.
4.2 Quantum Semantic Security
Here we define quantum semantic security under chosen-plaintext attacks (qSEM-
qCPA). As in the classical case, we want the definition of semantic security to
formally capture what we intuitively understand as a strong security notion.
In the quantum case, there are several choices to be made. We start by giv-
ing our formal definition of quantum semantic security, and justify our choices
afterwards.
Quantum SEM (qSEM) challenge phase: A sends to C a challenge template
consisting of classical decriptions of
– a quantum circuit Gm taking poly (n)-bit classical input and outputting m-
qubit plaintext states,
– a quantum circuit hm taking m-qubit plaintexts as input and outputting
poly (n)-qubit advice states,
– a quantum circuit fm taking m-qubit plaintexts as input and outputting
poly (n)-qubit target states.
The challenger C samples y $←− {0, 1}poly(n) and computes two copies of the
plaintext ρy = Gm(y). One is used to compute auxiliary information hm(ρy)
and one to compute the ciphertext UEnck ρy U
†
Enck
. C then replies with the pair
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(
UEnck ρy U
†
Enck
, hm(ρy)
)
. A’s goal is to output fm(ρy). We say that A wins the
qSEM-qCPA game if no quantum polynomial-time distinguisher can distinguish
A’s output from the target state fm(ρy) with non-negligible advantage.
In the reduced game, S receives no encryption, but only the auxiliary infor-
mation hm(ρy) from C. Analogously to the above case, Swins the qSEM-qCPA
game if no quantum polynomial-time distinguisher can distinguish S’s output
from the target state fm(ρy) with non-negligible advantage.
Definition 4.2 (qSEM-qCPA). A secret-key encryption scheme is called qSEM-
qCPA-secure if for every quantum polynomial-time machine A, there exists a
quantum polynomial-time machine S such that the challenge templates produced
by S and A are identically distributed and the success probability of A winning
the game defined by qCPA learning phases and a qSEM challenge phase is neg-
ligibly close (in n) to the success probability of S winning the reduced game.
When defining quantum semantic security, we have to deal with several is-
sues: First, we have to define how the plaintext distribution is described. In the
classical definition, the distribution is produced by a (classical) circuit Gm run-
ning on uniform input bits. We take the same approach here, but let Gm output
m-qubit plaintexts.
The second question is how to define the advice function. While the input
should be the plaintext quantum state ρy, the output could be either quantum
or classical. We decided to allow quantum advice as it leads to a more general
model and it includes classical outputs as a special case. In order for the chal-
lenger to compute both the encryption of the plaintext state ρy and the advice
state hm(ρy) without violation of the no-cloning theorem, we exploit how we
generate the message state. We simply run Sm twice on the same classical ran-
domness y to generate two copies of the plaintext state ρy. Another option would
have been to allow for entanglement between the plaintext message ρy and the
advice state hm(ρy). Allowing such entanglement would model side-channel in-
formation the attacker could obtain, for instance by learning the content of some
internal register of the attacked device. However, the resulting notion would not
be equivalent with qIND-qCPA anymore, because in qIND-qCPA, the challenge
plaintexts are provided by their classical descriptions and can therefore not be
entangled with the attacker.
Third, we have chosen to model the target function fm in the same way
as the advice function hm, i.e. we allow arbitrary quantum circuits that might
output quantum states. The reasoning behind allowing quantum output is again
to use the strongest possible, most general model. Allowing quantum output
however leads to the problem that, in general, we cannot physically test any-
more if an adversary A outputs exactly the result of the target function fm(ρy).
One option would be to require A’s output to be close to fm(ρy) in terms of
their trace distance. But two quantum states can be quantum-polynomial-time
indistinguishable even if their trace distance is large10. Since we are only inter-
10 Think of two different classical ciphertexts which are encrypted using a quantum-
computationally secure encryption scheme. Then, the ciphertext states are orthog-
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ested in computational security notions, we solve this problem by requiring QPT
indistinguishability as success condition for winning the SEM game.
Spoiler. Our qSEM-qCPA notion of semantic security is equivalent to qIND-
qCPA, and unachievable for those schemes which leave the size of the message
unchanged (like most block ciphers), see Section 6.1.
5 Relations
In this section we show relations between our new notions of indistinguishability
and semantic security in the quantum world. It is already known [GM84,Gol04]
that classically, IND-CPA and semantic security are equivalent. Our goal is to
show a similar equivalence for our new notions, plus to show a hierarchy of
equivalent security notions. Our results are summarized in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. The relations between notions of indistinguishability and semantic security in
the quantum world (previously known results in gray.)
We start by proving equivalence between IND-qCPA and SEM-qCPA.
Theorem 5.1 (IND-qCPA ⇔ SEM-qCPA). Let E be a symmetric-key en-
cryption scheme. Then E is IND-qCPA secure iff E is SEM-qCPA secure.
We split the proof of Theorem 5.1 into two propositions – one per direc-
tion. They closely follow the proofs for the classical case (see [Gol04, Proof of
Th. 5.4.11]), we recall them as they work as guidelines for the following proofs.
Proposition 5.2 (IND-qCPA ⇒ SEM-qCPA).
Proposition 5.3 (SEM-qCPA ⇒ IND-qCPA).
Proof (of Proposition 5.2 – Sketch.). The idea of the proof is to hand A’s circuit
as non-uniform advice to the simulator S. S runs A’s circuit and impersonates
the challenger C by generating a new key and answering all of A’s queries using
this key. When it comes to the challenge query, S encrypts the 1 . . . 1 string of
the same length as the original message. It follows from the indistinguishability
onal (and hence their trace distance is maximal), but they are computationally
indistinguishable.
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of encryptions that the adversary’s success probability in this game must be
negligibly close to its success probability in the real semantic-security game,
which concludes the proof. The only difference in the -qCPA case is that A and
S are quantum circuits, and that S has to emulate the quantum encryption
oracle instead of a classical one. uunionsq
Proof (of Proposition 5.3). We recall here the full proof as it is short. Assume
there exists an efficient distinguisher A against the IND-qCPA security of E .
Then we show how to construct an oracle machine MA that has access to
A and breaks the SEM-qCPA security of the scheme. MA runs A, emulat-
ing the quantum encryption oracle by simply forwarding all the qCPA queries
to its own oracle. As A executes an IND challenge query on m-bit messages
(x0, x1),MA produces the SEM template (Gm, hm, fm) with Gm describing the
uniform distribution over {x0, x1 } , hm = 1n (or any other function such that
hm(x0) = hm(x1)), and fm a function that fulfills fm(x0) = 0 and fm(x1) = 1
(i.e., the distinguishing function). Then MA performs a SEM challenge query
with this template, and given challenge ciphertext c, uses it to answer A’s query.
If, at that point, A performs more qCPA queries, MA answers again by for-
warding all these queries to its own oracle. Finally,MA outputs A’s output. As
A distinguishes encryptions of x0 and x1 with non-negligible success probability,
A will return the correct value of fm with recognizably higher probability than
guessing. As hm is independent of the encrypted message, no simulator can do
better than guessing. Hence, MA has a non-negligible advantage to output the
right value of fm. uunionsq
Next, we show equivalence between qIND-qCPA and qSEM-qCPA.
Theorem 5.4. [qIND-qCPA⇔ qSEM-qCPA] Let E be a symmetric-key encryp-
tion scheme. Then E is qIND-qCPA secure iff E is qSEM-qCPA secure.
Again, we split the proof of Theorem 5.4 into two propositions.
Proposition 5.5. [qIND-qCPA ⇒ qSEM-qCPA]
Proposition 5.6. [qSEM-qCPA ⇒ qIND-qCPA]
Proof (of Proposition 5.5 – Sketch.). The proof follows that of Proposition 5.2,
with some careful observations. Since A is a QPT adversary against the qSEM-
qCPA game, A’s circuit has a short classical representation ξ. So S gets ξ as non-
uniform advice and hence can implement and run A. The simulator S simulates
C for A by generating a new key and answering all of A’s qCPA queries. When
it comes to the challenge query, A produces a qSEM template, which S forwards
to the real C. Then S forwards C’s reply, plus a bogus encrypted state (e.g.,
UEnck |1 . . . 1〉), to A. If at this point A outputs a state ϕ which can be efficiently
distinguished from the correct fm(ρy) computed by the real C, we would have
an efficient distinguisher against the qIND-qCPA security of the scheme. Hence,
A’s (and therefore also S’s) output must be indistinguishable from fm(ρy) for
any QPT distinguisher, which concludes the proof. uunionsq
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Proof (of Proposition 5.6). This is also similar to the proof of Proposition 5.3.
Given an efficient distinguisher A for the qIND-qCPA game, our adversary for
the qSEM-qCPA game is an oracle machine MA running A and acting as fol-
lows. Concerning A’s qCPA queries, as usualMA just forwards everything to the
qSEM-qCPA challenger C. When A performs a challenge qIND query by send-
ing the classical descriptions of two states ϕ0 and ϕ1, MA prepares the qSEM
template (Gm, hm, fm), with Gm outputing ϕ0 for half of the possible y values
and ϕ1 for the other half, hm(ρy) = 1
n, and fm the identity map fm(ρy) = ρy.
ThenMA performs a qSEM challenge query with this template. Given challenge
ciphertext state UEnck ϕb U
†
Enck
(for b ∈ {0, 1}), he forwards it as an answer to
A’s challenge query. As A distinguishes UEnck ϕ0 U†Enck from UEnck ϕ1 U
†
Enck
with
non-negligible success probability, A returns the correct value of b with non-
negligible advantage over guessing. Then MA, having recorded a copy of the
classical descriptions of ϕ0 and ϕ1, is able to compute the state fm(ϕb) exactly,
and consequently win the qSEM-qCPA game with non-negligible advantage. As
hm generates the same advice state hm(ρy) = 1
n independently of the encrypted
message, no simulator can do better than guessing the plaintext. This concludes
the proof. uunionsq
Finally, we show the separation result between the two classes of security we
have identified (we show it between IND-qCPA and qIND-qCPA). This shows
that qIND-qCPA (and equivalently qSEM-qCPA) is a strictly stronger notion
than IND-qCPA (which is equivalent to SEM-qCPA).
Theorem 5.7 (IND-qCPA ; qIND-qCPA). There exists a symmetric-key
encryption scheme E which is IND-qCPA secure but not qIND-qCPA secure.
Proof (of Theorem 5.7). The scheme we use as a counterexample is the one
from [Gol04](Construction 5.3.9). It has been proven in [BZ13] that this scheme
is IND-qCPA secure if the used PRF is post-quantum secure. We exhibit a
distinguisher A which breaks the qIND-qCPA security of this scheme with high
probability. For ease of notation we restrict to the case of single-bit messages 0
and 1. A will simply choose as challenge states: |ϕ0〉 = H |0〉 = 1√2 |0〉+ 1√2 |1〉,
and |ϕ1〉 = H |1〉 = 1√2 |0〉 − 1√2 |1〉. When the challenger C applies the type-2
transformation to either of these two states, it is easy to see that in any case
the state is left unchanged. This is because UEnck just applies a permutation in
the space of the basis elements, but |ϕ0〉 and |ϕ1〉 have the same amplitudes on
all their components, except for the sign. As these two states are orthogonal,
they can be reliably distinguished by the adversary A who can then win the
qIND-qCPA game with probability 1. uunionsq
The above proof can be generalized to message states of arbitrary length, as
our impossibility result in Section 6.1 shows.
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6 Impossibility and Achievability Results
In this section we show that qIND-qCPA (and equivalently qSEM-qCPA) is
impossible to achieve for encryption schemes which do not expand the mes-
sage (such as stream ciphers and many block ciphers, without considering the
randomness part in the ciphertext). Therefore, for a scheme to be secure ac-
cording to this new definition, it is necessary (but not sufficient) to increase the
message size during the encryption. Interestingly, such an increase happens in
most public-key post-quantum encryption schemes, like for example LWE based
schemes [LP11] or the McEliece scheme [McE78].
Then we propose a construction of a qIND-qCPA–secure symmetric-key en-
cryption scheme. Our construction works for any (quantum-secure) pseudoran-
dom permutation (PRP). Given that block ciphers are usually modelled as PRPs,
it seems reasonable to assume that we can obtain a secure scheme when using
block ciphers with sufficiently large key and block size. Hence, our construc-
tion can be used to patch existing schemes, or as a guideline in the design of
quantum-secure encryption schemes from block ciphers.
6.1 Impossibility Result
First we formally define what it means for a cipher to expand or keep con-
stant the message size by defining the core function of a (secret-key) encryption
scheme. Intuitively, the definition splits the ciphertext into the randomness and
a part carrying the message-dependent information. This definition covers most
encryption schemes in the literature.
Definition 6.1 (Core function). Let (Gen,Enc,Dec) be a secret-key encryp-
tion scheme. We call the function f : K×{0, 1}τ ×M→ Y the core function of
the encryption scheme if, for some τ ∈ N:
– for all k ∈ K and x ∈ M, Enck(x) can be written as (r, f(k, r, x)), where
r ∈ {0, 1}τ is independent of the message; and
– there exists a function f ′ such that for all k ∈ K, r ∈ {0, 1}τ , x ∈ M, we
have: f ′(k, r, f(k, x, r)) = x.
For example, in case of Construction 5.3.9 from [Gol04] (where Enck(x) is
defined as (r, Fk(r)⊕x) for a PRF F ) the core function is f(k, r, x) = Fk(r)⊕x,
with f ′(k, r, z) = z ⊕ Fk(r).
Definition 6.2 (Quasi–length-preserving encryption). We call a secret-
key encryption scheme with core function f quasi–length-preserving if
∀x ∈M, r ∈ {0, 1}τ , k ∈ K ⇒ |f(k, x, r)| = |x|,
i.e., if the output of the core function has the same bit length as the message.
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Continuing the above example, Construction 5.3.9 from [Gol04] is quasi–
length-preserving.
The crucial observation is the following: For a quasi–length-preserving en-
cryption scheme, the space of possible input and (core function) output bitstrings
(with respect to plaintext and ciphertext) coincide, therefore these ciphers act
as permutations on this space. This means that if we start with an input state
which is a superposition of all the possible basis states, all of them with the
same amplitude, this state will be unchanged by the unitary type-(2) encryption
operation (because it will just ‘shuffle’ in the basis-state space amplitudes which
are exactly the same).
Theorem 6.3 (Impossibility Result). No quasi–length-preserving secret-key
encryption scheme can be qIND secure.
Proof. Let (Gen,Enc,Dec) be a quasi–length-preserving scheme. We show an
attack that is a generalization of the distinguishing attack in Theorem 5.7.
1. for m-bit message strings, the distinguisher D sets the two plaintext states
for the qIND- game to be: |ϕ0〉 = H |0m〉 , |ϕ1〉 = H |1m〉, where H is the m-
fold tensor Hadamard transformation. Notice that both these states admit
efficient classical representations, and are thus allowed in the qIND game.
2. The challenger flips a random bit b and returns |ψ〉 = UEnck |ϕb〉.
3. D applies H to the core-function part of the ciphertext |ψ〉 and measures it
in the computational basis. D outputs 0 if and only if the outcome is 0m,
and outputs 1 otherwise.
As already observed, applying UEnck to H |0m〉 leaves the state untouched:
since the encryption oracle merely performs a permutation in the basis space,
and since |ϕ0〉 is a superposition of every basis element with the same amplitude,
it follows that whenever b is equal to 0, the ciphertext state will be unchanged.
In this case, after applying the self-inverse transformation H again, D obtains
measurement outcome 0m with probability 1. On the other hand, if b = 1,
|ϕ1〉 = 12m/2
∑
y(−1)y·1
m |y〉 where a·b denotes the bitwise inner product between
a and b. Hence, |ϕ1〉 is a superposition of every basis element where (depending
on the parity of y) half of the elements have a positive amplitude and the other
half have a negative one, but all of them will be equal in absolute value. Applying
UEnc,k to this state, results in
1
2m/2
∑
y(−1)y·1
m |Enck(y)〉. After re-applying H,
the amplitude of the basis state |0m〉 becomes ∑y(−1)y·1m+Enck(y)·0m which is
easily calculated to be 0. Hence, the above attack gives D a way of perfectly
distinguishing between encryptions of the two plaintext states. uunionsq
Notice that the above attack also works if A is allowed to send quantum
states to C directly. Therefore, it also holds for the gqIND notion of quantum in-
distinguishability described in Section 3. In particular, the above theorem shows
that [Gol04, Construction 5.3.9], which in [BZ13] was shown to be IND-qCPA if
the used PRF is quantum secure, does not fulfill qIND, nor gqIND.
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This attack is a consequence of the well-known fact that, in order to perfectly
(information-theoretically) encrypt a single quantum bit, two bits of classical in-
formation are needed: one to hide the basis bit, and one to hide the phase (i.e.
the signs of the amplitudes). The fact that we are restricted to quantum opera-
tions of the form UEnck - that is, quantum instantiations of classical encryptions
- means that we cannot afford to hide the phase as well, and this restriction
allows for an easy distinguishing procedure.
6.2 Secure Construction
Here we propose a construction of a qIND-qCPA secure symmetric-key encryp-
tion scheme from any family of quantum-secure pseudorandom permutations
(see Appendix A for formal definitions).
Construction 6.4. For security parameter n, let m = poly (n) and τ = poly (n).
Consider an efficient family of permutations Πm+τ = (I, Π,Π−1) with key space
KΠ that operates on bit strings of length m+τ , and consider a plaintext message
space M = {0, 1}m, key space K = KΠ , and ciphertext space C = {0, 1}m+τ .
The construction is given by the following algorithms:
Key generation algorithm k ←− Gen(1n): on input of security parameter n,
the key generation algorithm runs k ←− I(1m+τ ) and returns secret key k.
Encryption algorithm y ←− Enck(x): on input of message x ∈ M and key
k ∈ K, the encryption algorithm samples a τ -bit string r $←− {0, 1}τ uni-
formly at random, and outputs y = pik(x‖r) (‖ denotes string concatenation).
Decryption algorithm x←− Deck(y): on input of ciphertext y ∈ C and key
k ∈ K, the decryption algorithm first runs x′ = pi−1k (y), and then returns the
first m bits of x′.
The soundness of the construction can be easily checked. The security is
stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 6.5 (qIND-qCPA security of Construction 6.4). If Πm+τ is a
family of quantum-secure pseudorandom permutations (qPRP), then the encryp-
tion scheme (Gen,Enc,Dec) defined in Construction 6.4 is qIND-qCPA secure.
In the next section, we prove the security of a more powerful scheme which
includes the above theorem as special case of a single message block.
6.3 Length Extension
Construction 6.4 has the drawback that the message length is upper bounded
by the input length of the qPRP (minus the bit length of the randomness).
However, like in the case of block ciphers, we can overcome this issue with a
mode of operation. More specifically, we can handle arbitrary message lengths
by splitting the message into m-bit blocks and applying the encryption algorithm
of Construction 6.4 independently to each message block (using the same key
24
but new randomness for each block). This procedure is akin to a ‘randomized
ECB mode’, in the sense that each message block is processed separately, like in
the ECB (Electronic Code Book) mode, but in our case the underlying cipher
is inherently randomized (since we use fresh randomness for each block), so we
can still achieve qCPA security. For simplicity we consider only message lengths
which are multiples of m. The construction can be generalized to arbitrary mes-
sage lengths using standard padding techniques. Moreover, the randomness for
every block can be generated efficiently using a random seed and a post-quantum
secure PRNG.
Construction 6.6. For security parameter n, let m = poly (n) and τ = poly (n).
Consider an efficient family of permutations Πm+τ = (I, Π,Π−1) with key space
KΠ that operates on bit strings of length m+τ , and consider a plaintext message
space M = {0, 1}µm for µ ∈ N, µ = poly (n), key space K = KΠ , and ciphertext
space C = {0, 1}µ(m+τ). The construction is given by the following algorithms:
Key generation algorithm k ←− Gen(1n): on input of security parameter n,
the key generation algorithm runs k ←− I(1m+τ ) and returns secret key k.
Encryption algorithm y ←− Enck(x): on input of message x ∈ M and key
k ∈ K, the encryption algorithm splits x into µ m-bit blocks x1, . . . , xµ. For
each block xi, the encryption algorithm samples a new τ -bit string ri
$←−
{0, 1}τ uniformly at random, and outputs yi = pik(xi‖ri) (‖ denotes string
concatenation). The ciphertext is y = y1‖ . . . ‖yµ.
Decryption algorithm x←− Deck(y): on input of ciphertext y ∈ C and key
k ∈ K, the decryption algorithm first splits y into µ m+τ -bit blocks y1, . . . , yµ.
Then, it runs x′i = (pi
−1
k (yi))m for each block (where (s)m refers to taking
the first m bits of bit string s). It returns the plaintext x′ = x′1, . . . , x
′
µ.
The soundness of the construction can be checked easily. For the security, we
observe that splitting a µm-qubit plaintext state into µ blocks of m-qubits can
introduce entanglement between the blocks. We will address this issue through
the following technical lemma.
Lemma 6.7. Let E be the quantum channel that takes as input an arbitrary m-
qubit state, attaches another τ qubits in state |0〉, and then applies a permutation
picked uniformly at random from S2m+τ to the computational basis space. Let T
be the constant channel which maps any m-qubit state to the totally mixed state
on m+ τ qubits. Then, ‖E − T ‖ ≤ 2−τ+2.
Proof. In order to consider the fact that the m-qubit input state might be en-
tangled with something else, we have to start with a purification of such a state.
Formally, this is a bipartite pure 2m-qubit state |φ〉XY =
∑
x,y αx,y |x〉X |y〉Y
whose m-qubit Y register is input into the channel and gets transformed into
idX ⊗ E(|φ〉〈φ|) = trΠ |ψ〉〈ψ| where
|ψ〉 =
∑
x∈{0,1}m,y∈{0,1}m,pi∈S2m+τ
αx,y |x〉X |pi(y||0)〉C |pi〉Π .
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By definition of the diamond-norm, we have to show that for any 2m-qubit state
ρ, we have that ‖(id ⊗ E)(ρ) − (id ⊗ T )(ρ)‖tr ≤ 2−τ+2. Due to the convexity
of the trace distance, we may assume that ρ = |φ〉〈φ| is pure with |φ〉XY =∑
x,y αx,y |x〉X |y〉Y . Hence, we obtain
(idX ⊗ E)(|φ〉〈φ|) = trΠ |ψ〉〈ψ|
=
1
2m+τ !
∑
x,x′,y,y′,pi
αx,yαx′,y′ |x〉〈x′|X ⊗ |pi(y‖0)〉 〈pi(y′‖0)|C
=
1
2m+τ !
∑
x,x′,y
αx,yαx′,y|x〉〈x′|X ⊗
∑
pi
|pi(y‖0)〉 〈pi(y‖0)|C
+
1
2m+τ !
∑
x,x′,y 6=y′
αx,yαx′,y′ |x〉〈x′|X ⊗
∑
pi
|pi(y‖0)〉 〈pi(y′‖0)|C
=
∑
x,x′,y
αx,yαx′,y|x〉〈x′|X ⊗
1
2m+τ
∑
z
|z〉〈z|C
+
∑
x,x′,y 6=y′
αx,yαx′,y′ |x〉〈x′|X ⊗
1
2m+τ (2m+τ − 1)
∑
z 6=z′
|z〉〈z′|C
= trY |φ〉〈φ| ⊗ τC + χXC
= (idX ⊗ T )(|φ〉〈φ|) + χXC ,
where we defined the “difference state”
χXC :=
∑
x,x′,y 6=y′
αx,yαx′,y′ |x〉〈x′|X ⊗
1
2m+τ (2m+τ − 1)
∑
z 6=z′
|z〉〈z′|C .
In order to conclude, it remains to show that ‖χXC‖tr ≤ 2−τ+2. For the C-
register χC =
1
2m+τ (2m+τ−1)
∑
z 6=z′ |z〉〈z′|C , one can verify that the 2m+τ eigen-
values are (c · (2m+τ − 1),−c,−c, . . . ,−c) where c := 12m+τ (2m+τ−1) . Hence, the
trace norm (which is the sum of the absolute eigenvalues) is exactly c ·2(2m+τ −
1) = 2−m−τ+1.
For the X-register, we split χX into two parts χX = ξX − ξ′X where
ξX :=
∑
x,x′
|x〉〈x′|
∑
y,y′
αx,yαx′,y′ ,
ξ′X :=
∑
x,x′
|x〉〈x′|
∑
y
αx,yαx′,y ,
and use the triangle inequality for the trace norm ‖χX‖tr = ‖ξX − ξ′X‖tr ≤
‖ξX‖tr + ‖ξ′X‖tr. Observe that ‖ξX‖tr = ‖
∑
x,y αx,y |x〉
∑
x′,y′ αx′,y′ 〈x′| ‖tr =
‖|s〉〈s|‖tr for the (non-normalized) vector |s〉 :=
∑
x,y αx,y |x〉. Hence, the trace-
norm ‖ξX‖tr = | 〈s | s〉 | =
∑
x |
∑
y αx,y|2 ≤
∑
x
∑
y |αx,y|2 · 2m = 2m by the
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the normalization of the αx,y’s. Furthermore, we
note that ξ′X is exactly the reduced density matrix of |φ〉XY after tracing out
26
the Y register. Hence, ξ′X is positive semi-definite and its trace norm is equal to
its trace which is 1. In summary, we have shown that
‖χXC‖tr = ‖χX‖tr · ‖χC‖tr ≤ (‖ξX − ξ′X‖tr) · 2−m−τ+1
≤ (‖ξX‖tr + ‖ξ′X‖tr) · 2−m−τ+1 ≤ (2m + 1) · 2−m−τ+1 ≤ 2−τ+2 .
uunionsq
If we consider a slightly different encryption channel ET which still maps m
qubits to m + τ qubits but where the permutation pi is not picked uniformly
from S2m+τ , but instead we are guaranteed that a certain set T ⊂ {0, 1}m+τ
of outputs never occurs, we can consider such permutations w.l.o.g. as picked
uniformly at random from a smaller set S2m+τ−|T |. In this setting, we are inter-
ested in the distance of the encryption operation ET from the slightly different
constant channel T T which maps all inputs to the (m+ τ)-qubit state which is
completely mixed on the smaller set {0, 1}m+τ \ T . By modifying slightly the
proof of Lemma 6.7 we get the following.
Corollary 6.8. Let ET and T T be the channels defined above. Then,
‖ET − T T ‖ ≤ 4
2τ − |T |/2m . (3)
We can now prove the security of Construction 6.6. We give the proof for
gqIND-qCPA, and then qIND-qCPA follows immediately from Theorem 3.3.
Theorem 6.9 (gqIND-qCPA security of Construction 6.6). If Πm+τ is a
family of quantum-secure pseudorandom permutations (qPRP), then the encryp-
tion scheme (Gen,Enc,Dec) defined in Construction 6.6 is gqIND-qCPA secure.
Proof. We want to show that no QPT distinguisher D can win the gqIND-qCPA
game with probability substantially better than guessing. We first transform the
game through a short game-hopping sequence into an indistinguishable game for
which we can bound the success probability of any such D.
Game 0. This is the original gqIND-qCPA game.
Game 1. This is like Game 0, but instead of using a permutation drawn from
the qPRP family Πm+τ , a random permutation pi ∈ S2m+τ is chosen from the
set of all permutations over {0, 1}m+τ . The difference in the success probability
of D winning one or the other of these two games is negligible. Otherwise, we
could use D to distinguish a random permutation drawn from Πm+τ from one
drawn from S2m+τ . This would contradict the assumption that Πm+τ is a qPRP.
Game 2. This is like Game 1, but D is guaranteed that the randomness used for
each encryption query are µ new random τ -bit strings that were not used before.
In other words, the challenger keeps track of all random values used so far and
excludes those when sampling a new randomness. Since in Game 1 the same
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randomness is sampled twice only with negligible probability, the probability of
winning these two games differs by at most a negligible amount.
Game 3. This is like Game 2 except that the answer to each query asked by D
also contains the randomness r1, . . . , rµ used by the challenger for answering that
query. Clearly, D’s probability of winning this game is at least the probability
of winning Game 2.
When the modified gqIND game 3 starts, D chooses two different plaintext
states and sends them to the challenger, who will then choose one of them and
send it back encrypted with fresh randomness rˆ1, . . . , rˆµ. Let Q denote the set of
q · µ = poly(n) query values used during the previous qCPA-phase. We have to
consider that from this phase, D knows a set T ⊂ {0, 1}m+τ of ’taken’ outputs,
i.e. he knows that any pi(x‖rˆi) will not take one of these values as rˆi has not been
used before. So, from the adversary’s point of view, pi is a permutation randomly
chosen from S′, the set of those permutations over {0, 1}m+τ that fix these |T |
values. In order to simplify the proof, we will consider a very conservative bound
where |T | = q · µ · 2m, and the size of S′ is |S′| = (2m+τ − |T |)! (notice that
this bound is very conservative because it assumes that the adversary learns 2m
different (classical) ciphertexts for every of the q · µ ‘taken’ randomnesses, but
as we will see, this knowledge will be still insufficient to win the game.)
By construction, the encryption of a µm-qubit (possibly mixed) state σ is
performed in µ separate blocks of m qubits each. We are guaranteed that fresh
randomness is used in each block, hence it follows from Corollary 6.8 that Enck(σ)
is negligibly close to the ciphertext state where the first m+τ qubits are replaced
with the completely mixed state (by noting that |T |/2m = q · µ is polynomial
in n in our case, and hence the right-hand side of (3) is negligible.). Another
application of Corollary 6.8 gives negligible closeness to the ciphertext state
where the first 2(m+τ) qubits are replaced with the completely mixed state etc.
After µ applications of Corollary 6.8, we have shown that Enck(σ) is negligibly
close to the totally mixed state on µ(m + τ) qubits. As this argument can be
made for any cleartext state σ, we have shown that from D’s point of view, all
encrypted states are negligibly close to the totally mixed state and therefore
cannot be distinguished. uunionsq
Corollary 6.10 (qIND-qCPA security of Construction 6.6). If Πm+τ is a
family of quantum-secure pseudorandom permutations (qPRP), then the encryp-
tion scheme (Gen,Enc,Dec) defined in Construction 6.6 is qIND-qCPA secure.
7 Conclusions and Further Directions
We believe that many of the current security notions used in different areas of
cryptography are unsatisfying in case quantum computers become reality. In this
respect, our work contributes to a better understanding of which properties are
important for the long-term security of modern cryptographic primitives. Our
work leads to many interesting follow-up questions.
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There are many other directions to investigate, once the basic framework
of ‘indistinguishability versus semantic security’ presented in this work is com-
pleted. A natural direction is to look at quantum CCA1 security in this frame-
work. This topic was also initiated in [BZ13] relative to the IND-qCPA model;
it would be interesting to extend the definition of CCA1 security to stronger
notions obtained by starting from our qIND-qCPA model.
In Section 3.3 we left open the interesting question on whether it is possible
at all to find a separating example between the notions of qIND and gqIND.
That is, find a symmetric-key encryption scheme E which is qIND-secure, but
not gqIND-secure. Finding such an example (or provable lack of) would shed
further light on the security model we consider.
We have so far not taken into account models where the adversary is allowed
to initialize the ancilla qubits used in the encryption operation used by the
challenger (i.e. the |y〉 in |x, y〉 7→ |x, y ⊕ Enck(x)〉). These models lead to the
study of quantum fault attacks, because they model cases where the adversary
is able to ‘watermark’ or tamper with part of the challenger’s internal memory.
Moreover, we have not considered superpositions of keys or randomness: these
lead to a quantum study of weak-key and bad-randomness models. The authors
of this paper are not aware of any results in these directions.
One outstanding open problem is to define CCA2 (adaptive chosen ciphertext
attack) security in the quantum world. The problem is that in the CCA2 game
the challenger has to ensure that the attacker does not ask for a decryption of
the actual challenge ciphertext leading to a trivial break. While this is easily
implemented in the classical world, it raises several issues in the quantum world.
What does it mean for a ciphertext to be different from the challenge ciphertext?
And, more importantly: How can the challenger check? There might be several
reasonable ways to solve the first issue but, as long as the queries are not classical,
we are not aware of any possibility to solve the second issue without disturbing
the challenge ciphertext and the query states.
Our secure construction shows how to turn block ciphers into qIND-qCPA
secure schemes. An interesting research question is whether there exists a general
patch transforming an IND-qCPA secure scheme into a qIND-qCPA secure one.
It is also important to study how our transformation can be applied to modes
of operation different from Construction 6.6.
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A Formal Definitons
Here we give some formal definitions that we omitted in the main body as they
are somewhat standard. We include them for the paper to be self-contained. We
begin with detailed formal definitions for SEM-CPA and IND-CPA. Afterwards
we define quantum-secure pseudorandom permutations.
SEM-CPA and IND-CPA. The following definitions are more precise than
the ones we use in the main text. They are included here for reference and were
taken from Goldreich ([Gol04]).
Definition A.1 (SEM-CPA). A secret-key encryption scheme, (Gen,Enc,Dec),
is said to be semantically secure under chosen plaintext attacks iff for every pair
of probabilistic polynomial-time oracle machines A1 and A2, there exists a pair
of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms A′1 and A′2 such that the following
two conditions hold:
1. For every positive polynomial p(·), and all sufficiently large n and z ∈
{0, 1}poly(n) it holds that
Pr

v = fm(x) where
k ←− Gen(1n)
((Sm, hm, fm), σ)←− AEnck1 (1n, z)
c←− (Enck(x), hm(x)),where x←− Sm(Upoly(n))
v ←− AEnck2 (σ, c)

< Pr

v = fm(x) where
((Sm, hm, fm), σ)←− A′1(1n, z)
x←− Sm(Upoly(n))
v ←− A′2(σ, 1|x|, hm(x))
+ 1p(n) (4)
Recall that (Sm, hm, fm) is a triplet of circuits consisting of a poly-sized
circuit Sm specifying a distribution over m-bit long plaintexts, a circuit com-
puting an advise function hm : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}∗, and a circuit computing
a target function fm : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}∗, and that x is a sample from the
distribution induced by Sm.
2. For every n and z, the first elements (i.e., the (Sm, hm, fm) part) in the
random variables A′1(1n, z) and AEncGen(1n)1 (1n, z) are identically distributed.
Definition A.2 (IND-CPA). A secret-key encryption scheme, (Gen,Enc,Dec),
is said to have indistinguishable encryptions under chosen plaintext attacks iff
for every pair of probabilistic polynomial-time oracle machines, A1 and A2, for
every positive polynomial p(·), and all sufficiently large n and z ∈ {0, 1}poly(n) it
holds that ∣∣∣p(1)n,z − p(2)n,z∣∣∣ < 1p(n)
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where
p(i)n,z
def
= Pr

v = i where
k ←− Gen(1n)
((x1, x2), σ)←− AEnck1 (1n, z)
c←− Enck(xi)
v ←− AEnck2 (σ, c)

where |x1| = |x2|.
Please note that there are no restrictions regarding A’s oracle queries, i.e.
A1 as well as A2 are allowed to ask for encryptions of x1 and x2.
Quantum PRP. We now define quantum-secure pseudorandom permutation
families. We restrict ourselves to efficient permutation families that have as do-
main binary strings of a certain length as these are the only ones we are using
in this work. Let S2n be the set of all permutations of n-bit strings.
Definition A.3 (Efficient Permutation Family). Let n ∈ N, we call a fam-
ily of permutations Πn = {pik : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n} ⊂ S2n with key space KΠ and
domain {0, 1}n efficient if there exists a triple of probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithms (I, Π,Π−1) such that:
1. The initialization algorithm I(1n) takes as input the parameter n and outputs
a random function key k
$←− KΠ from the key space.
2. The function Π takes as input a function key k and a domain element x and
outputs pik(x).
3. The function Π−1 takes as input a function key k and a domain element x
and outputs pi−1k (x).
We sometimes abuse notation and write pi instead of pik and pi
$←− Πn for the
process of running I(1n). A quantum-secure pseudorandom permutation family
(qPRP) is an efficient permutation family that achieves the pseudorandomness
property in presence of a quantum adversary that can query the permutation pi
with superpositions of domain elements x. It is defined as follows:
Definition A.4 (Quantum PRP). An efficient permutation family Πn is said
to be a quantum-secure pseudorandom permutation family if for every quantum
polynomial-time oracle machine A, it holds that∣∣∣Pr
pi
$←−Πn
[
A|pi〉(1n) = 1
]
− Pr
pi
$←−S2n
[
A|pi〉(1n) = 1
]∣∣∣ ≤ negl (n) ,
where the superscript |·〉 denotes oracle access in superposition.
Note that the permutations are chosen by the game. Hence, keys are classical.
A permutation family Πn is called a strong quantum PRP, if a random mem-
ber of Πn is computationally indistinguishable from a uniform permutation even
if the attacker A can query (in superposition) both the permutation pi and the
inverse permutation pi−1. Notice that the construction in Theorem 6.5 does not
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require strong quantum PRPs. The reason is that, even if we are considering
type-(2) transformations (which could be used to compute pi−1), these transfor-
mations are implemented by the challenger, because we are in the (C) model.
And since we only consider CPA scenarios here, and not CCA, the adversary is
never granted access to the decryption oracle. Hence, pi−1 is not needed by the
reduction.
B Example Encryption Scheme
In this section we recall Construction 5.3.9 from [Gol04] which achieves IND-
CPA security starting from a pseudorandom function family.
Construction B.1 ([Gol04, Construction 5.3.9]). Let n ∈ N be the security
parameter, τ,m ∈ poly (n), F = {Fk : {0, 1}τ → {0, 1}m | k ∈ K} be a pseudo-
random function family with key space K. Then the following triple of algorithms
form a symmetric-key encryption scheme with message space {0, 1}m:
Gen(1n): On input of the security parameter, returns a uniformly random key
k
$←− K for the PRF F as secret key.
Enc(x, k): On input of message x and key k returns cipher text c = (r, c′) where
randomness r
$←− {0, 1}τ is a uniformly random τ bit string and c′ is com-
puted as
c′ ←− Fk(r)⊕ x.
Dec(c, k): On input of cipher text c = (r, c′) and key k returns plain text
x←− c′ ⊕ Fk(r).
C Proof of Theorem 3.4
In this section we explain how the q-IND-CPA-2 indistinguishability notion for
secret-key encryption of quantum messages introduced by Broadbent and Jef-
fery [BJ15, Appendix B] is equivalent to our gqIND-qCPA notion in the case
that the encryption operation is a symmetric-key classical functionality operat-
ing in type-(2) mode. In [BJ15], the authors study the definition of quantum
indistinguishability relative to the case of quantum fully homomorphic encryp-
tion. The general definition of quantum symmetric-key encryption scheme has
been formalized in [ABF+16] in the following way.
Definition C.1. A quantum symmetric-key encryption scheme (or qSKE) is a
triple of quantum circuit families of polynomial depth:
1. (key generation) Q.Gen : 1n 7→ k ∈ K
2. (encryption) Q.Enc : K ×X → Y
3. (decryption) Q.Dec : K × Y → X
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such that ‖Q.Dec ◦Q.Enc− IX ‖ ≤ negl (n) for all k ∈ Supp (Q.Gen(1n)), where
K is the key space, X is the plainstate space, Y is the cipherstate space, I is
the identity operator, and Q.Dec, Q.Enc must be intended acting with the same
(classical) key k.
Then the authors of [ABF+16] define a notion of quantum indistinguishability
for quantum symmetric-key encryption schemes (which they call IND, but which
we relabel here as q-IND-qse for ease of reading) as follows.
Definition C.2 (q-IND-qse). A qSKE (Q.Gen, Q.Enc, Q.Dec) has indistin-
guishable encryptions (or is q-IND-qse secure) if for every QPT adversary A =
(M,D) we have:
|Pr [ DQ.Enc(ρME) = 1 ]− Pr [ DQ.Enc(|0〉〈0|M ⊗ ρE) = 1 ]| ≤ negl (n)
where ρME ←M, ρE = trM (ρME), DQ.Enc = D◦(Enck⊗IE) and the probabilities
are taken over k ← Q.Gen(1n) and the internal randomness of Enc, M, and D.
Basically, the above definition states that for any QPT adversary A, it must
be hard to distinguish an encryption of any state ρM from an encryption of
|0〉〈0|M (where ρE is auxiliary information carried between the two partsM and
D of A). Once we add a quantum CPA phase (M and D are given oracle access
to Enck), Definition C.2 translates to the notion of q-IND-CPA from [BJ15].
And, also in [BJ15, Theorem B.2], this notion q-IND-CPA has been shown to
be equivalent to another notion, q-IND-CPA-2, which considers the case where
in the above game there are two messages chosen by the adversary, ρ0 and ρ1,
instead of a single state ρ and the fixed |0〉〈0| state. In other words, the q-IND-
CPA-2 game can then be summarized as follows.
Definition C.3 (q-IND-CPA-2). A qSKE (Q.Gen, Q.Enc, Q.Dec) is q-IND-
CPA-2 secure) if any QPT adversary A having oracle access to Q.Enck has
probability at most negligibly better than guessing of winning the following game:
1. A generates two plaintext state messages ρ0, ρ1 ∈ X and sends them to the
challenger C;
2. C flips a random bit b $←− {0, 1};
3. C traces out (discards) ρ1−b;
4. C encrypts ρb to ϕ← Q.Enck(ρb);
5. A receives back ϕ from C;
6. A outputs a bit b′, and wins the game iff b = b′.
Finally, notice that Definition C.3 is equivalent to Definition 3.2 when the
encryption algorithm Q.Enc is actually a type-(2) unitary operator UEnc of a
classical simmetric-key encryption scheme (Gen,Enc,Dec). This concludes the
proof of Theorem 3.3. uunionsq
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D Semantic Security with Quantum Advice States
In Section 4.1 we left open the question of what happens if the messages (and the
function to be computed about the message) are still classical, but the auxiliary
advice can be a quantum state. Here we discuss this scenario.
A possible first approach is the following: Let Uξm be a unitary (the advice
unitary) that takes as input a basis element |x〉 representing a classical m-bit
message x as well as (if required) an auxiliary register prepared by C and com-
putes a quantum advice state |ξm〉. Then we can define the following challenge
phase and the corresponding notion.
Quantum-advice SEM challenge phase (qaSEM): A sends C a challenge
template consisting of: a poly-sized classical circuit Sm specifying a distribution
over m-bit plaintexts x, a classical description of the advice unitary Uξm , and a
target function fm : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}poly(n) for an m ∈ N of A’s choice. C replies
with the pair (Enck(x), |ξm〉), where x is sampled according to Sm and |ξm〉
is computed by constructing and evaluating Uξm on |x〉. A’s goal is to output
fm(x). Again, S plays in the reduced game and learns only |ξm〉.
Definition D.1 (qaSEM-qCPA). A secret-key encryption scheme is said to
be qaSEM-qCPA-secure if for every quantum polynomial-time machine A, there
exists a quantum polynomial-time machine S such that the challenge templates
produced by S and A are identically distributed and the success probability of A
winning the qaSEM-qCPA game is negligibly close (in n) to the success proba-
bility of S winning the reduced game.
At a first glance it might seem as if qaSEM-qCPA is equivalent to SEM-
qCPA as a security notion because having a classical advice function h(x) is just
a special case of a quantum advice circuit depending on x. Notice however that
as we restrict Uξm to be a circuit computing a unitary operator U |x〉 this notion
is meaningless because it is trivially achievable by any encryption scheme. The
reason is that, in this case, both A and S can always apply U−1 to |ξm〉 to
recover the message – it is like restricting the classical notion to the case where
the advice function h is just a permutation chosen by A (resp. S).
To fix this problem, we have to allow more general quantum circuits U ′ξm
that can somehow provide non-reversible information, for example by applying
some partial measurement at the end, or by providing A (resp. S) only with
some output qubits, while C keeps the others. Towards this end let U ′ξm be an
arbitrary quantum circuit (the advice circuit) that takes as input a basis element
|x〉 representing a classical m-bit message x, a quantum state ρm provided by
A (resp. S) (that includes possibly needed auxiliary registers), and computes a
quantum advice state ξm. This leads to the following definition:
Ideal quantum advice, classical SEM challenge phase (iqSEM): A sends
C a challenge template consisting of: a poly-sized classical circuit Sm specifying
a distribution over m-bit plaintexts, a classical description of the quantum ad-
vice circuit U ′ξm , a quantum state ρm, and a target function fm : {0, 1}m →
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{0, 1}poly(n) for an m ∈ N of A’s choice. C replies with the pair (Enck(x), ξm),
where x is sampled according to Sm and ξm is computed by constructing and
executing U ′ξm . A’s goal is to output fm(x).
The iqSEM-qCPA game is defined by qCPA learning phases and a iqSEM
challenge phase. This leads to the following definition:
Definition D.2 (iqSEM-qCPA). A secret-key encryption scheme is said to
be iqSEM-qCPA-secure if for every quantum polynomial-time machine A, there
exists a quantum polynomial-time machine S such that the challenge templates
produced by S and A are identically distributed and the success probability of A
winning the iqSEM-qCPA game is negligibly close (in n) to the success probability
of S winning the reduced game.
This notion turns out to be equivalent to SEM-qCPA (and IND-qCPA). The
reason is that having a quantum advice state does not really give any additional
power to A in the case of classical messages and target functions. This can be
seen from the reduction between IND-qCPA and SEM-qCPA – see the proofs of
Propositions 5.2 and 5.3. In one case, the advice state is only used to pass A’s
code from the first circuit of S to the second one (which can also be done with
a quantum advice state), in the other case it is set to a constant function.
It seems like introducing arbitrary quantum advice circuits (as opposed to
superpositions of classical advices) is not meaningful as long as the messages
are still classical. Consequently, we proceed in Section 4.2 with our search for a
notion of quantum semantic security considering quantum message states.
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